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I. INTRODUCTION
In a unanimous decision, the Tax Court in Nelson v. Commis-
sioner held that cancellation of indebtedness income realized at the S
t Reprinted with permission from the Journal of S Corporation Taxation, Vol.
10, Issue 3. Copyright Warren Gorham Lamont, Inc., of the RIA Group, 31 St.
James Avenue, Boston, MA 02111. All rights reserved.
tt James D. Lockhart is a CPA with Lurie, Besikof, Lapidus & Co., LLP, in
Minneapolis. James E. Duffy is a tax attorney with Briggs & Morgan in Minneapo-
lis. Each author received his LL.M. in Taxation at New York University School of
Law and were Attorney Advisors to the U.S. Tax Court. The authors are grateful
for the contributions of Scott M. Hagel and Matthew R. Nyberg of Lurie, Besikof,
Lapidus & Co., LLP.
1. 110 T.C. 114 (1998). Notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit was filed with the Tax Court on May 8, 1998.
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corporation level does not pass-through to its shareholders and
thereby increase the basis of their stock. This ruling is a retreat from
its earlier opinion in Winn v. Commissioner, issued less than eight
months before Nelson, in which the court held in favor of the taxpayer
on the same issue. While the decision in Winn was based on a single,
narrow argument, it gave most commentators and practitioners com-
fort because it confirmed their interpretation of Section 108 of the
Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") as applied in conjunction with
the conduit rules of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code
"Subchapter S."'
One commentator has suggested that the Nelson holding was not
unexpected because a contrary rule would result in a windfall for the
taxpayer.i A reading of the Nelson opinion makes it clear that the
court is troubled with the taxpayer's apparent windfall from a stock
basis increase. While the court states that its holding is based upon
the plain language of the statutes, it strains the statutory construction
to reach what it believes to be the correct policy objective: no stock
basis increase for which the taxpayer has borne no economic outlay
due to excluded COD income.7 The authors submit that the result in
Nelson was unexpected based upon the plain meaning of the applica-
ble statutes, their respective legislative histories, and interpretations
of analogous areas of tax law.
II. BACKGROUND
The issue in Nelson is relatively straightforward: Are shareholders
of an insolvent S corporation entitled to a stock basis increase equal
to their allocable share of the corporation's realized COD income
that is excluded from Section 61 (a)'s gross income definition pursu-
2. See id. at 130.
3. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3167 (1997), withdrawn and superceded, 75 T.C.M. (CCH)
1840 (1998). Notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was filed
with the Tax Court on April 28, 1998.
4. See id.
5. Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, or to the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereun-
der. The Internal Revenue Code is contained in Title 26 of the United States
Code.
6. See Richard M. Lipton, Tax Court Rejects S Corp. Basis Step-up for COD Income In
Nelson, 88J. TAx'N 272, 277 (1998).
7. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 128 (1998). As used in this arti-
cle, "COD" refers to cancellation of debt income or income from the discharge of
indebtedness. See generally I.R.C. § 108 (1994).
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ant to Section 108?8 Many commentators have agreed that an af-
firmative answer to this question is provided by a straightforward in-
terpretation of the pertinent statutes.9
A. Statutory Framework
The resolution of the issue rests upon the interaction of Sub-
chapter S and Section 108.
1. Subchapter S
In determining a shareholder's tax liability, Section 1366(a) (1)
provides, in pertinent part, that each taxpayer must take into account
his allocable share of the corporation's "items of income (including
tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or credit the separate treatment
of which could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder."10
The character of any item included in the shareholder's income
or loss is determined under Section 1366(b) as if the "item were real-
ized directly from the source from which realized by the corporation,
or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the corporation.""
Under Section 1367 (a) (1), "[ t] he basis of each shareholder's stock in
an S corporation shall be increased ... by the items of income de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) of Section 1366 (a) (1).,,12
Congress enacted Subchapter S to allow taxpayers to operate in
corporate form without the imposition of a tax, which would nor-
8. SeeNelson, 110T.C. atll6.
9. See generally JAMES S. EUsTICE &JOEL D. KUNz, FEDERAL LNCOME TAXATION OF
S CORPORATIONS, 14.0412] (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998) (stating that a basis increase
should result from excluded COD income if the Code is read literally); BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 6.10[2] (6th ed. 1994) (interpreting the Code to allow share-
holders to increase their basis); Robert L. Cohen, Exempt COD Income Creates S Corp.
Basis Adjustment, 24 TAX ADVISOR 788 (1993) (analyzing the statutory language of the
Code and discussion the possible grounds for an IRS challenge on the increase of ba-
sis issue); AICPA, PRE-RELEASE COMMENTS REGARDING REGULATIONS ON DISCHARGE OF
INDEBTEDNESS INCOME UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1366, Apr. 15, 1995, at
1 (analyzing TAM 9423003 and criticizing the reasoning which was later adopted by
the court in the Nelson decision); Bryan P. Collins & Mark A. Schneider, TAM
9423003-The IRS Says Excluded COD Income Does Not Increase S Corporations Stock Basis,
6J. S.CoRP. TAX'N 348 (1995) (analyzing TAM 9423003); Stephen R. Looney, Recent
Developments: Income From Discharge of Indebtedness Excluded From Gross Income Under Sec-
tion 108 Does Not Increase S Corporation Shareholder'Basis, 6 J. S.CoRP. TAX'N 356 (1995)
(criticizing TAM 9423003).
10. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1) (A) (1994).
11. I.R.C. § 1366(b) (1994).
12. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1) (1994).
1999]
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mally apply if the corporation liquidated and continued business as a
partnership. 3 In light of this policy objective, the approach in Sub-
chapter S was to treat income items as they are treated under the
Subchapter K regime. Thus, Congress provided that an S corpora-
tion's taxable income will be computed under the same rules appli-
cable to partnerships under Section 703.' 4 As with partners in a part-
nership, each shareholder in an S corporation is to take into account
his pro rata share of income and deduction items of the corporation.
15
The character of the items of income are to pass through to the S
corporation shareholders in the same manner as the character of
such items of a partnership passes through to partners. Further, both
taxable and nontaxable income serve to increase a shareholder's basis
in the S corporation stock in a manner analogous to that provided for
in a partner's outside partnership basis. 16 Accordingly, the basis ad-
justment rules of Section 1367 were written to parallel the basis ad-
justment rules regarding partners under Section 705.'
7
With respect to suspended losses, Section 1366(d) (1) provides
that the aggregate amount of losses taken into account by a share-
holder under Section 1366(a) cannot exceed the sum of the share-
holder's adjusted basis of the shareholder's S corporation stock and
any indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder.' 8 Any loss
or deduction disallowed due to insufficient stock or debt basis is car-
ried over indefinitely.19 The carryover of losses and deductions are
the sole tax attributes of the shareholder and cannot be transferred
to any other, or subsequent, shareholder.'Y
With respect to carryovers of S corporations, Subchapter S is ex-
plicit. Section 1371 (b) (2) states that " [n]o carryforward, and no car-
ryback, shall arise at the corporate level for a taxable year for which a
corporation is an S corporation."2 '
13. See S. REP. No. 97-640, at 5 (1982).
14. See id. at 15.
15. See id. at 17.
16. See id. at 18.
17. See id. at 2, 17, 18.
18. SeeI.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1994).
19. See I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2) (1994).
20. See S. REP. No. 97-640, at 3 (1982).
21. I.R.C. § 1371 (b) (2) (1994).
[Vol. 25
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The Internal Revenue Code explicitly defines gross income to
include COD income.2 Sections 101 through 135 of Subtitle A pro-
vide for various exemptions from gross income. Under Section
108(a), gross income does not include any amount that would be in-
cludable in gross income by reason of the discharge of indebtedness
of the taxpayer if: (1) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case; (2) the
discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent; (3) the indebtedness
discharged is qualified farm indebtedness; or (4) in the case of a tax-
payer other than a C corporation, the indebtedness discharged is
qualified real property business indebtedness. 3 In the case of insol-
vency, the amount excluded cannot exceed the amount by which the
taxpayer is insolvent 24 Under Section 108(d) (3), the term "insolvent"
means the "excess of liabilities over the fair market value of assets." 25
Section 108 also provides that "the amount by which the taxpayer is
insolvent, shall be determined on the basis of the taxpayer's assets
and liabilities immediately before the discharge."26
Any amount excluded by reason of insolvency, title 11, or quali-
fied farm indebtedness, is to be applied to reduce the tax attributes of
the taxpayer as provided by Section 108(b) .27 Any attribute reduction
is not to be made, however, until the determination of the taxpayer's
tax liability for the year of discharge. 2s The effect of this provision is
to not reduce any attributes until the beginning of the following tax
year. In the not uncommon event that a corporation sells its assets or
ceases existence in the year of discharge, Section 108 is silent with re-
spect to attribute reduction.
Section 108(b) (2) provides that the first attribute to be reduced,
and the one at issue in Nelson, is Net Operating Losses ("NOL"). Any
NOL incurred in the year of discharge and any NOL carryover to
such year is reduced first.29 However, the taxpayer may elect to re-
22. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994). Section 61(a) provides that "gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including... [i] ncome from dis-
charge of indebtedness." Id.
23. See I.R.C. § 108(a) (1994).
24. See I.R.C. § 108(e) (1994).
25. I.R.C. § 108(d) (3) (1994).
26. Id.
27. See I.R.C. § 108(b) (1994).
28. See I.R.C. § 108(b) (4) (A) (1994).
29. See I.R.C. §108(b) (2) (A) (1994). The other tax attributes are reduced in
the following order: (1) the general business credit; (2) the minimum tax credit; (3)
1999]
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duce the basis of depreciable property before reducing any other tax
attribute, including NOLs.
30
With respect to S corporations, Section 108(d) (7) contains spe-
cial rules. Section 108(d) (7) (A) provides that insolvency and tide 11
determinations3' and attribution reduction 32 are applied at the corpo-
rate level . Section 108 (d) (7) (B) provides that for purposes of NOL
attribute reduction, any suspended loss or deduction that is disal-
lowed in the year of discharge under Section 1366(d) (1) will be
treated as an NOL for that taxable year.34
B. TAMS
The Service first addressed whether COD income excluded from
gross income under Section 108(a) passes through to shareholders
under Section 1366(a) as tax-exempt income for which S corporation
shareholders may increase their stock basis under Section 1367 in
Technical Advice Memorandum ("TAM") 9423003."5 In the TAM,
the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of an S corporation that be-
came insolvent and defaulted on its bank loans.36 In restructuring the
S corporation's debt, a portion of the debt was discharged. 3' The
amount of the discharge was not in excess of the amount by which
the S corporation was insolvent. 
38
The Service ruled that the shareholder was not entitled to a basis
increase for two reasons. First, the COD income that is excluded
from gross income under Section 108 does not pass through to S
corporation shareholders as a separately stated item of tax-exempt in-
come." Second, discharge of indebtedness is tax-deferred income
not tax-exempt income. °  According to the Service, Section
108(d) (7) (A) "operates as an exception to the general pass through
scheme applicable to S corporations and S corporation shareholders
capital loss carryovers; (4) basis; (5) passive activity loss and credit carryovers; and (6)
foreign tax credit carryovers. See I.RC. § 108(b) (2) (B)-(G) (1994).
30. SeeI.R.C. §108(b)(5) (1994).
31. See I.R.C. §108(a) (1994).
32. SeeI.R.C. §108(b) (1994).
33. SeeI.R.C. §108(d) (7) (A) (1994).
34. See I.R.C. §108(d) (7) (B) (1994).
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under subchapter S."41 Therefore, the Service concluded that to the
extent of insolvency, there is no COD income passed through to the
shareholder because the exclusion from income and the reduction in
tax attributes apply at the corporate level.
The taxpayer argued that because the reduction in tax attributes
under Section 108(b) is not made until after the determination of the
tax for the taxable year of discharge, all of the S corporation's items
of separately stated income pass through to the shareholders in the
year of discharge, increasing the shareholders basis in their stock
prior to application of the ordering rules in Section 108(b) (2).43 The
Service rejected this argument on the grounds that the mechanics of
Section 108(b) operate at the corporate level and because amounts
excluded under Section 108(a) (1) are not tax-exempt income.4
In support of its position that the amounts excluded under Sec-
tion 108(a) are not tax-exempt income, the Service cited the legisla-
tive history to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198045 which provides that
no amount is to be included in income by reason of debt discharge;
instead, the amount of discharged debt excluded from gross income
is applied to reduce certain tax attributes.46 Once a taxpayer reduces
its tax attributes as required by Section 108(b) (1), any remaining
debt discharge amount is disregarded; that is, such amount does not
47result in income or have other tax consequences.
The Service also cited language in the legislative history that
states that the rules of the statute are intended to carry out the con-
gressional intent of deferring, but eventually collecting within a rea-
sonable period, tax on ordinary income realized from debt dis-
charge .4  The Service concluded that debt discharge income
excluded under Section 108(a) is not tax-exempt, but tax deferred,
and therefore, is not a separately stated item of tax-exempt income
within the meaning of the parenthetical language of Section
1366 (a) (1) (A). 49 The Service reached the same conclusion using the
41. Id.; seeI.R.C. § 108(d) (7) (A) (1994).
42. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9423003 (June 10, 1994).
43. See id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
44. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9423003 (June 10, 1994).
45. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389.
46. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B.
620, 625).
47. See id.
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same rationale applied in TAMs 9541001 and 9541006.50
C. Winn v. Commissioner
In a decision that many practitioners were expecting, the Tax
Court in Winn v. Commissioner,51 held that the taxpayers were entitled
to increase their respective adjusted bases in the S corporation stock
by their allocable share of COD income.2 In Winn, the taxpayers
(Winn and Giditz) were shareholders in PDW&A, Inc., an S corpora-
tion. PDW&A was a partner in Parker Properties. 5' Parker realized
$4,154,891 of COD income in 1991.54 PDW&A's allocable share of
the COD income was $2,021,296.55 At the time Parker realized the
COD income, PDW&A was insolvent to the extent of $2,181,748.56
Each taxpayer's allocable share of PDW&A's COD income was
$1,010,648. s7 Both Winn and Gitlitz increased their stock basis in
PDW&A by that amount.5 Gitlitz claimed losses from PDW&A total-
ing $1,010,648 on his 1991 federal income tax return.5 9 Absent the
basis increase, the deductibility of these losses would have been sus-
pended under Section 1366(d). 60 Winn, however, did not claim a loss
on his 1991 federal income tax return because he believed that the
passive activity loss limitations prevented recognition of the deduc-
tion. 61 It was not until 1992 that Winn claimed the PDW&A losses
50. In TAM 9541001, the Service ruled that because the reduction of tax at-
tributed occurs at the corporate level, excluded COD income is neither allocated
nor passed through to S corporation shareholders. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9541001
(Oct. 13, 1995). In TAM 9541006, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of an S
corporation that realized COD income when a related S corporation acquired
debt of the first S corporation from an unrelated party for less than the face
amount. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9541006 (Oct. 13, 1995). The first S corporation
was insolvent at the time the related S corporation acquired the debt. See id. The
Service first ruled that the acquisition of the debt was treated under Section
108(e) (4) (A) as though the notes had been acquired by the S corporation itself.
See id. As such, the S corporation realized income from discharge of indebtedness.
See id.
51. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3167 (1997), withdrawn and superceded, 75 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1840 (1998).
52. Seeid. at3169.




57. See id. at 3167-68.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 3168.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 3167-68.
[Vol. 25
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carried over from 1991 on federal income tax return. 62
The Service argued that:
[i]f the court were to hold that excluded COD... is
an item of income under Code Section 1366, then
you would have to find that it flows through to the
taxpayers and they increase their basis. Respondent's
position is that it's not an item of income and never
63flows through.
The court rejected the Service's argument that Sections 61
(a) (12) and 108 should operate differently than Sections 61(a) (4)
and 103 (relating to interest) and Sections 61 (a) (10) and 101 (relat-
ing to insurance).64 The court aptly stated:
Section 61 requires that certain amounts be included
in income, i.e., items of income. Specifically, Section
61 (a) (12) requires that income from discharge of in-
debtedness be included in gross income. Absent any
exclusionary provision, items of income are included
in gross income .... Sections 101 through 135 ex-
clude specific items of income from gross income.
Discharge of indebtedness income to the extent of in-
solvency is one of the items of income so excluded.6
Accordingly, the Tax Court held that, by its inclusion in the
definition of gross income under Section 61 (a) (12), COD is an "item
of income" for purposes of Sections 1367(a) (1) and 1366(a) (1) in
66determining a shareholder's basis in S corporation stock.
III. NELSON V. COMMISSIONER
In Nelson, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of Metro Auto,
Inc. (MAI), an S corporation, which in 1991 realized COD income of
$2,030,568 as a result of the disposition of its assets and a related
agreement with its creditors.67 The COD income of $2,030,568 ex-
62. See id. at 3168.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 3169.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 115 (1998).
1999]
9
Lockhart and Duffy: Tax Court Rules in Nelson that S Corporation Excluded COD Income
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ceeded MAI's losses by $1,375,790 in 1991. 68 At the time of the dis-
charge of indebtedness, MAI was insolvent and excluded the entire
amount of the discharge from gross income.69 The taxpayer in-
creased the basis in his MAI stock by $1,375,790, disposed of the
stock, and deducted a long-term capital loss that included the in-
crease in basis.70 The theory of the taxpayer's argument was that the
COD income realized by MAI, but excluded under Section 108, is tax-
exempt income for purposes of Sections 1366(a) and 1367(a). 71 As tax-
exempt income, it passes through to the S corporation shareholders
via Section 1366 (a) (1) (A) as a separately stated item of income and,
consequently, provides a corresponding stock basis increase via Sec-
tion 1367(a).72
While the Service agreed that it was proper to exclude the COD
income, it did not agree that the shareholder's stock basis should be
increased by that amount.73  Consequently, the Service disallowed
$1,375,790 of the stock loss on the ground that the taxpayer lacked
sufficient basis in the MAI stock. As in the TAMs, the Service argued
that pursuant to Section 108(d) (7) (A), COD income excluded under
Section 108 does not pass through to the S corporation shareholder.75
Because that Section explicitly provides that the income exclusion
and attribute reduction rules apply solely at the S corporation level,
the Service argued that the COD income realized by the entity is not
permitted to pass through to the shareholder.76
No question of fact was presented in the case. Both parties
agreed that in 1991 MAI realized COD income and that it was insol-
vent.77 The parties further agreed that such income was excludable
under Section 108.78 The only question in dispute was whether the
Code permitted the taxpayer to increase the basis of his MAI stock by





71. See id. at 119.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 116.
75. See id. at 119; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 9541006 (Oct. 13, 1995); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9541001 (Oct. 13,1995); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9423003 (June 10, 1994).
76. SeeNelson, 110T.C. at 119.
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A. The Majority Opinion
The Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion authored by Judge Ham-
blen, held that COD income, which is not includable in gross income
under Section 108 (a), does not pass through to a shareholder of an S
corporation and therefore does not increase the shareholder's basis
in his stock. 80 The Tax Court's decision was based on three ration-
ales: first, under the plain meaning of 108(d) (7), excluded COD in-
come does not pass through to the shareholder of an S corporation;
second, excluded COD income is not tax-exempt income that oper-
ates to increase stock basis under Sections 1366 and 1367; and third,
allowing excluded COD income to increase the stock basis would re-
sult in a windfall to the shareholder.81
1. Plain Meaning
The court resolved the statutory issue by focusing on the plain
meaning of Section 108(d) (7) (A). The taxpayer argued that
108(d) (7) (A) requires that an S corporation be determined solvent
or insolvent prior to the shareholder level determination of the
shareholder's income tax liability and reduction of suspended losses,
if any. 82 In agreeing with the Service's interpretation of that Section,
the court found that the literal language of the statute mandates a
corporate, as opposed to a shareholder, level application. 83 The
court explained that such a result was mandated because the specific
language of 108(d) (7) (A) overrides the more general provisions of
Subchapter S, and, in particular the pass-through rules of Sections
1366 and 1367.84
The majority's analysis that Section 108(d) (7) (A) provides an
explicit exception to the pass-through rules of Sections 1366 and
1367 goes beyond the wording of the statute. Such a construction is
not necessitated by the legislative history. Prior to 1984, Section 108
provided that an insolvency determination was to be made at the
shareholder level in the same manner that is utilized with respect to
partnerships and partners.8 5 Congress amended the statute in 1984 to
provide that the insolvency exception be applied at the corporate
80. See id. at 130.
81. See id. at 121, 124, 130.
82. See id. at 120.
83. See id. at 121.
84. See id. at 121-22.
85. See I.R.C. § 108 (1984).
1999]
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level so that all shareholders would be treated in the same manner.86
This means that unlike partners who may receive disparate treatment
depending upon each partner's financial condition, i.e., solvent, in-
solvent, or in a title 11 proceeding, all shareholders are to be afforded
the same treatment regardless of their financial condition because
the exclusion of the COD income depends upon the financial status
of the S corporation.
Nothing in Section 108(d) (7) (A) mentions or even contem-
plates that the pass-through rules of Subchapter S will be impacted by
operation of this statute. Section 108(d) (7) (A) merely provides that
the determination of insolvency and attribute reduction occurs at the
corporate level. Further, there is nothing in the legislative history
that indicates the 1984 amendment to Section 108 operates as an ex-
ception to pass-through treatment for Subchapter S.87 The legislative
history does not indicate any purpose of the revised statute other
than to ensure that all shareholders are accorded the same tax treat-
ment.
88
The court interpreted Section 108(d) (7) (B) to mean that losses
suspended under Section 1366(d) are "deemed" to be NOLs.89 In
particular, the court stated that "the suspended losses are carried to
the corporate level pursuant to Section 108(d) (7) (A), and converted to
net operating losses pursuant to Section 108(d) (7) (B)." 90 In the
court's view, the fact that suspended losses are determined on the
shareholder level pursuant to Section 1366(d), without more, does
not denote that the conversion and subsequent reduction are per-
formed on the same level. 9' Consequently, the court concluded that
Section 108(d) (7) (B) does not require that excluded COD income
be included in the shareholder's calculation of income tax liability
and suspended losses of Section 1366(d),g2 and that Section
108(d) (7) (A) does not require that such income pass through to the
shareholders.
9 3
It is unclear how the plain meaning of "treated as" can be inter-
preted as "converted to." Such an interpretation is contrary to the
86. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 99 Stat. 494. See also H.R.
RFP. No. 98-432, at 334 (1983).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 120-21.
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legislative history of Section 1366 and the language of Section
1371(b) (2). 9' The legislative history to Section 1366 makes it clear
that the loss carryforward is that of the shareholder.9 There is no in-
dication in any subsequent statute or its legislative history that this in-
tention had been changed. Moreover, Section 1371 (b) (2) states that
no carryforward shall arise at the S corporation level.96 The court's
conclusion that a shareholder's suspended losses are no longer his
own and that the S corporation can use them as a loss carryforward is
in direct conflict with the Subchapter S authority discussed previ-
ously.
97
The court stated that neither Sections 108(d) (7) (A) nor
108(d) (7) (B) require that excluded COD income at the S corpora-
tion level pass through to the shareholder.98 By reading these Sec-
tions in the way that most commentators and the authors submit is
the correct interpretation, Section 108(d) (7) does not operate to
convert shareholder suspended losses into S corporation NOLs. 9"
Rather, Section 108 (d) (7) requires that the insolvency determination
and the reduction of S corporation attributes, not including the sus-
pended losses of the shareholders, occur at the corporate level.100
Suspended losses are the S corporation equivalent of a C corpora-
tion's NOL carryover. By treating suspended losses as an NOL car-
ryover, Section 108(d) (7) (B) provides the mechanism by which the
shareholder attribute (suspended losses) will be subject to the exist-
ing corporate attribute reduction regime under 108(b) (2) (A). The
statutory requirement that the insolvency determination and other
attribute reduction occur at the entity level, has no bearing on the
pass-through nature of the COD income. We must look to Sections
1366 and 1367 for the appropriate shareholder level treatment, as
Congress clearly intended.
Further, the court's analysis does not consider the shareholder
level effect. As previously noted, the losses are losses of the share-
holder, not attributes of the S corporation. The more consistent in-
terpretation of the statutes would be that Section 108(d) (7) works in
tandem with the Subchapter S rules, not in opposition or as an ex-
94. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 334 (1983); see also I.R.C. § 1371(b)(2)
(1994).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 334.
96. See I.R.C. § 1371 (b) (2) (1994).
97. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
98. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 123.
99. See supra note 9.
100. See I.R.C. §108(d) (7) (1994).
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ception to the pass-through regime.' °'
The court in Nelson then considered the statute in the overall
scheme of the Code. °2 In this regard, the court found that Section
1366(b) undermined the taxpayer's argument. 0 3 Under that Section,
the character of any item included under Section 1366(b) is deter-
mined as if such item were realized "directly from the source from
which realized by the corporation, or incurred in the same manner as
incurred by the corporation.' '0 4 Based on this language, the court
found that Section 1366(a) (1) (A), in conjunction with 108(d) (7) (A),
precludes excluded COD income from recognition at the share-
holder level. 10 Because excludable COD income does not pass from
the S corporation to its shareholders under 1366(a) (1) (A), the court
concluded such income cannot increase their stock basis under Sec-
tion 1367 (a) (1) (A).'
0 6
The statutory scheme and legislative history of both Section 108
and Subchapter S do not support the majority's interpretation of the
interaction of those provisions. The legislative history of Section 1366
states that an S corporation's income will be computed under the
same rules presently applicable to partnerships and, as with partners
of a partnership, each shareholder will take into account his pro rata
share of income and loss items in a manner that parallels the partner-
ship rules of Section 702.107 Section 702(b) provides that the charac-
ter of any item of income or loss "shall be determined as if such item
were realized directly from the source from which realized by the
partnership, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the part-
nership.',0 8  This language is parallel to the language in Section
1366(b).' 9 Under Section 108, insolvent partners are permitted to
increase the outside basis of their partnership interest by the amount
of excluded COD income." ° Given the call for identical treatment of
101. As a practical matter, shareholders, and not the S corporation, maintain
basis and suspended loss records. Hence, it is not only statutorily consistent to re-
port excluded COD income to the shareholders, but it is necessary in order for the
losses to be reduced, if necessary, under Section 108(b).
102. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 121.
103. Seeid. at 121.
104. I.R.C. § 1366(b) (1994).
105. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122.
106. See id.
107. See S. REP. No. 97-640, at 17 (1982).
108. I.R.C. § 702(b) (1994).
109. Compare I.R.C. § 702(b) (1994) with I.R.C. § 1366(b)(1994) (indicating
that income is determined at the partner or shareholder level).
110. SeeS. REP. No. 95-1035, at 22 n.28 (1980).
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partnerships and S corporations in the legislative history and the par-
allel statutes, there is no rationale for disparate tax treatment between
partners and S corporation shareholders with respect to excluded
COD income under Section 108. The court's interpretation is also in
conflict with the conduit nature of S corporations.
The court found further support for its position in Section
108(d) (6)."' Under that Section, in the case of a partnership, the in-
solvency determination is to be applied at the partner, as opposed to
the partnership, level."' According to the majority, this Section per-
mits the inference that the treatment of excluded COD income was
intended to be decoupled with respect to S corporations and partner-
ships."3 In support of this proposition, the court cited the 1984 legis-
lative history to Section 108(d) (7) (A) which articulates Congress' in-
tent that all S corporation shareholders be treated in the same
manner by providing that the exclusion of income and attribute re-
duction be applied at the corporate level.'
1 '
As previously stated, the legislative history to Section 108 re-
quires that excluded COD income increase an insolvent partner's
outside partnership basis."' The legislative history to Sections 1366
and 1367 is clear that the manner in which shareholders account for
the corporation's items of income and loss and the manner in which
shareholders adjust the basis of their stock are to be identical to the
manner in which partners account for partnership items and adjust
their outside partnership interests."6 While Section 108 provides that
the insolvency determination will be made at different levels (i.e., the
partnership or S corporation levels), there is nothing in the statute or
legislative history that requires, once the insolvency determination
has been made, partners and S corporation shareholders to account
for the items in a different manner. It is consistent with the parallel
rules of Subchapters K and S to afford partners and S corporation
shareholders the same tax treatment with respect to COD income ex-
111. SeeNelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 122 (1998).
112. See I.R.C. § 108(d) (6) (1994).
113. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122.
114. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1019 (1983)).
115. See supra note 86 and accompanying discussion.
116. See S. REP. No. 97-640, at 6, 15, 18 (1982). The legislative history states
that "[T] he bill adopts a partnership approach which treats all items ... generally
like they are treated under the partnership provisions." Id. at 6. (referring to
items of income and loss that pass through to the corporation's shareholders).
With respect to Section 1367, the legislative history states that the rules providing
for increases in a shareholder's basis "will be analogous to those provided for
partnerships under section 705." Id. at 18.
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cluded under Section 108.
The court in Nelson stated that if Congress had intended a basis
step-up for excluded COD income, it would have included a statutory
provision for such a result." 7 Most commentators thought Congress
had so provided in Sections 1366 and 1367.18 Contrary to the Tax
Court's conclusion, Sections 108(b), 108(d)(7), 1366, and 1367
should be interpreted so that they work in tandem. This means that
excluded COD income under Section 108 would pass through to the
shareholders under Sections 1366 and 1367. Consequently, the
shareholder would receive a stock basis step-up and a corresponding
reduction in his suspended losses. Any attribute reduction in sus-
pended losses at the shareholder level would need to be reported to
the S corporation to determine to what extent, if any, corporate level
attributes must be reduced. An analysis of the remainder of the
court's decision, we believe, further supports such an interpretation.
2. Tax-exempt Income
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that excluded COD
income was tax-exempt for purposes of Section 1366(a) (1) (A) and
therefore, under the language of the statute, was required to pass
through to the S corporation shareholders." 9  The taxpayer at-
tempted to analogize excluded COD income to insurance proceeds
in excess of premiums paid under Section 101 (a) not being subject to
tax; to state and local bond interest under Section 103(a) not being
subject to tax; and to income arising from the recovery of any amount
deducted in prior years to the extent that such income did not pro-
duce a tax benefit under Section 111 (a) not being subject to tax.
120
The court accepted the Service's position that excluded COD income
is merely deferred, not permanently exempt."'
While there is no definition of tax-exempt income in Section
1366(a) (1) (A), there was no suggestion by the Tax Court in Nelson
that the income excluded under the other Code Sections cited by the
taxpayer is not tax-exempt. The taxpayer's argument is supported by
the general statutory regime. As stated in Winn: "Absent any exclu-
sionary provision, items of income are included in gross income. Sec-
tions 101 through 135 exclude specific items of income from gross
117. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122-23.
118. See supra note 9.
119. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122.
120. See id. at 124.
121. See id. at 125.
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The court, in a somewhat cryptic portion of its opinion, sought
to distinguish the taxpayer's "attempt to correlate the exclusion from
gross income pursuant to Section 108 with an item of income that is
'tax-exempt' pursuant to Section 1366 (a) (1) (A), e.g., Section 103 (a)"
by contrasting the term "exclusion" with the language in Section
103(a) that "expressly delineates that gross income does not include
income derived from interest paid on any State or local bond.""2 4 The
court's basis for making this comparison is not clear. Section 108(a)
contains language identical to Section 103(a) (i.e., gross income does
not include any amount by reason of the discharge of indebtedness) .125
Where the term "excluded" is used in other subsections of Section
108, it is used to refer back to an amount that "gross income does not
include" under Section 108(a) .126 Accordingly, there is no statutory
basis for distinguishing between income that is exempt under Section
101 or Section 103 and income that is exempt under Section 108.
The court and one commentator believe that the basis increase
is not warranted because the shareholder/taxpayer has not borne the
economic cost or outlay for the tax benefit of the basis increase.
7
While as a matter of general tax policy, a taxpayer is entitled to basis
for his investment of after tax dollars, there are numerous exceptions
to that rule, including the ability to increase basis for amounts bor-
rowed and receipt of other types of tax-exempt income by S corpora-
tion shareholders and partners in partnerships.
Example. A, an S corporation, owned by A and B, paid
the insurance premiums on a key-man life insurance
policy on employee E with a death benefit of $1 mil-
lion. At the time of Es death, the insurance premi-
ums paid totaled $10,000. The full amount of the in-
surance proceeds is not included in gross income and
the shareholders receive a corresponding stock basis
122. Winn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3167, 3169 (1997), withdrawn
and superceded, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1840 (1998).
123. See Winn, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3167.
124. Nelson, 110 T.C. at 125 (emphasis added). The court referred to the Web-
ster's dictionary definitions of exclusion and exclude in support of its finding that
those terms do not necessarily contemplate exclusion on a permanent basis. See id.
125. Compare I.R.C. § 103(a) (1994) with I.R.C. § 108(a) (1994).
126. I.R.C. § 108 (1994).
127. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 118; seeLipton, supra note 6, at 278.
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increase by the same amount.
In the Example neither A nor B has directly incurred an eco-
nomic outlay of the after-tax costs of the insurance proceeds. The
point is that both Section 101 and 108, in conjunction with Sections
1366 and 1367, can produce an increase in S corporation stock basis
without a commensurate after-tax investment by the shareholders.
Accordingly, in light of the identical statutory language of Sections
101 and 108, it is unclear why the absence of an economic outlay re-
sults in excluded COD income being treated differently from ex-
cluded insurance proceeds.
Instead of trying to explain why income exempt under Section
108 should be accorded different treatment than other items specifi-
cally excluded from gross income in Sections 101 through 135, the
court focused on the permanency of the exclusion. 28 The majority
stated that the legislative history of Section 108 "manifests an inten-
tion to 'insure that the debt discharge amount eventually will result in
ordinary income.' 12 9 The court then noted that the Supreme Court
in United States v. Centennial Savings Bank 30 observed that the effect of
Section 108 is not to exempt such income from taxation, but rather
to defer the payment of the tax by reducing the taxpayer's annual
depreciation deductions or by increasing the size of taxable gains
upon the disposition of the property.131
The Tax Court's citation to Centennial Savings is dicta. 132 In that
case, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether penalties
collected by a bank from customers due to the customer's premature
withdrawal of certificates of deposit constituted COD income that the
bank could exclude "as qualified business indebtedness" by reducing
the basis of its depreciable assets. 3 A determination of whether Sec-
tion 108 constitutes a deferral or an exemption with respect to ex-
cluded COD income was unnecessary to the resolution of the issue
before the Court and the Court undertook no critical analysis of that
question.'34
128. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 121.
129. Id. at 125 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2
C.B. 620, 625).
130. 499 U.S. 573 (1991).
131. SeeNelson, 110 T.C. at 125 (citing Centennial Savings, 499 U.S. at 580).
132. See Centennial Savings, 499 U.S. at 580.
133. Id. at 579.
134. Section 108(c), prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, required the amount
excluded from gross income as qualified business indebtedness to be applied to re-
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The legislative history of Section 108 only partially supports the
Tax Court's conclusion in Nelson that excluded COD income is tax
deferred rather than tax-exempt. As the court points out, the legisla-
tive history of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 3 states that the Act is
intended to carry out the congressional intent of deferring, but even-
tually collecting within a reasonable period, tax on ordinary income
136realized from debt discharge. However, as the Tax Court also ac-
knowledges, the legislative history was intended to accommodate
both bankruptcy policy and tax policy.137 Arguably, to the extent that
the amount of excluded COD income exceeds the available tax at-
tributes to be reduced, tax policy takes second place to the bank-
ruptcy policy of preserving a fresh start for the debtor/taxpayer. If
the primary policy to be served in such circumstances is the tax policy
of ensuring that none of the excluded COD income escapes eventual
taxation, a mechanism could have been provided to ensure this re-
sult. No such mechanism is provided.
Accordingly, to the extent the COD income exceeds the tax at-
tributes to be reduced, it is "necessarily tax-exempt on a permanent
basis., 13 This consequence is clearly contemplated by the legislative
history quoted by the Tax Court that "any further remaining debt
discharge... does not result in income or have other tax conse-
quences." 13 9 Therefore, COD income that is not included in taxpayer
income is not entirely tax deferred or tax-exempt. The treatment of
the tax-exempt portion as tax deferred is no more appropriate than
the converse treatment. The answer is that excluded COD income
was intended to be, and is, tax-exempt to the extent it exceeds tax at-
tributes available for reduction.
3. Taxpayer's Windfall
In the course of its analysis of the relatively sparse legislative his-
tory, the majority revealed what appears to have really been troubling
it. According to the court, if the taxpayer is allowed a basis increase
duce basis of depreciable property and limited the amount excludable from income
to the aggregate adjusted basis of depreciable property held by the taxpayer at the
beginning of the taxable year following the taxable year of discharge. See I.R.C. §
108(c) (1982).
135. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389.
136. See S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 620, 625.
137. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 135.
138. Id.
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on account of the excluded COD income, an economic windfall
would be bestowed. 14° The court reached this conclusion because it
perceived that the creditors, and not the taxpayer, incurred an eco-
nomic outlay.4 1 As discussed above, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, the economic outlay consideration does not appear to distin-
guish Section 108 in this context from Sections 101 or 103.141
Moreover, to the extent application of the relevant statutes results in
what the court perceives to be an unwarranted windfall, principles of
judicial restraint dictate that the statute be applied as written unless
such application would create an absurd result, which the Tax Court
did not allege.
143
The taxpayer cited CSI Hydrostatic Testers, Inc. v. Commissioner,1' as
analogous and dispositive authority.4 5 In that case, CSI Hydrostatic
owned 80 percent of the stock of Sea Level International with which
it filed consolidated returns.'" In 1987, Sea Level adopted a plan of
liquidation in bankruptcy pursuant to which it was discharged from• • • 147
$4,321,245 of debt outstanding after its liquidation. Sea Level ex-
cluded from its taxable income the discharged debt pursuant to Sec-
tion 108(a) and included the COD income in its earnings and profits
for its final taxable year pursuant to Section 312(1).' 44 Pursuant to
Treasury Regulations Section 1.1502-32(b)(1), CSI made a positive
adjustment to its investment basis in its Sea Level stock equal to un-
distributed E&P. 149 As a result of CSI's positive basis adjustment, CSI
140. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 128.
141. See id.
142. See supra Part III.B.
143. "[It is a] well-established principle that, where the language at issue is
ambiguous, it is necessary to examine the underlying statutory framework and leg-
islative history to understand its correct meaning." Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner,
102 T.C. 721, 727 (1994). On other hand it also has been stated that:
[C]ourts are forbidden to tamper with the plain meaning of the
words employed unless they are clearly ambiguous or nonsensi-
cal. The concomitant rule of interpretation is that courts may
not re-write unartfully but unambiguously drafted legislation in
order to accomplish results perceived by the court to be the
goals of such flawed legislation.
Id. at 727-28 (citations omitted).
144. 103 T.C. 398 (1994), affdpercuriam, 62 F.3d 136 (5th Cir. 1995).
145. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 125-26.
146. See CSIHydrostatic, 103 T.C. at 400.
147. See id. at 401.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 402.
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eliminated the balance of an excess loss account in its Sea Level stock
that would have been created and would have been required to be
included in CSI's income under Treasury Regulations Section 1.1502-
19, but for the inclusion of Sea Level's COD income in Sea Level's
E&P for the purpose of the investment basis adjustment rules of Sec-
tion 1.1502-32. "0
The Service took the position that CSI was not entitled to a posi-
tive adjustment to its investment basis, arguing that unless the bal-
ance in a parent corporation's excess loss account ("ELA") is in-
cluded in the parent corporation's income when the subsidiary
becomes insolvent, the consolidated group will have received tax
benefits it will never have to pay for, which is contrary to the purpose
of Section 1.1502-19.15' The Tax Court in CSI Hydrostatic Testers noted
that effective for taxable years following the year in issue, Congress
amended Section 1503(e) (1) to provide that, solely for the purpose
of determining gain or loss on a disposition of a subsidiary's stock
and the amount of any inclusion in income of an ELA, the positive
investment adjustment to the stock's basis under the Consolidated
Return Regulations would not include E&P from COD income ex-
cluded from the subsidiary's taxable income under Section 108 to the
extent tax attributes other than basis are not reduced. )
5 2
In Nelson, the Tax Court correctly stated that CSI Hydrostatic Test-
150. See id. at 402-03.
151. See id. at 405-07 (quoting Wyman-Gordon Co. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
207, 222-23 (1989)). The court stated:
The significance of the addition of section 312(1) to the Code
cannot be understood without considering important amend-
ments to section 108 that also were made by the Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980. That section was significantly rewritten to provide,
among other things, that a taxpayer who under new section
312(1) excludes discharge of indebtedness income from taxable
income due to insolvency and does not elect to reduce basis in
its depreciable assets under section 1017, must reduce certain other
tax attributes. The first tax attribute to be reduced under section
108 is the debtor's net operating losses. Thus, under amended
sections 108 and 312(1), if these provisions were applicable to
petitioners in 1978... [the second-tier subsidiary] would be en-
tiled to exclude the... discharge of indebtedness from its tax-
able income, and it would be entitled to increase is earnings
and profits (and thereby reduce is excess loss account) by the
amount of the discharge of indebtedness income.
Id. at 406-07.
152. See id. at 415.
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ers was decided within the context of the Consolidated Return Regu-
lations as applicable to C corporations and that it contained no ex-
press support for the proposition that COD income must pass
through to the shareholders of an S corporation.53 However, the Tax
Court's approach in deciding CSI Hydrostatic Testers arguably under-
cuts any reliance in Nelson on the windfall that results from the in-
crease in shareholder basis for excluded COD income. The windfall
in Nelson is no greater than the tax benefit that CSI received and did
not have to pay for. Yet, in CSI Hydrostatic Testers, the court apparently
felt constrained to apply the statute and regulations as written despite
the perceived windfall to the taxpayer. The court stated that because
the Consolidated Return Regulations carry the force and effect of
law, it would not invalidate them unless clearly contrary to the intent
of Congress.15 4 In contrast, the Tax Court in Nelson, even in light of
the relatively sparse legislative history bearing on the issue, appeared
more inclined to construe the statutory language to prevent the tax-
payer from obtaining an unwarranted benefit.
The court's last rationale for its holding was that in the partner-
ship context and prior to the enactment of Section 108 in its current
form, an increase in basis is allowable when COD income is actually
recognized, and no basis increase is warranted when application of
the insolvency exception prevents such recognition' In this connec-
156tion, the court cited Babin v. Commissioner and Gershkowitz v. Commis-
sioner.157 Because those cases have no factual or legal relevance to Nel-
son, it is unclear why they were cited.
Not only has Babin been criticized, 5 but the Service has stated
that it does not apply to partnership transactions occurring after
1980.'9 Thus, in the Service's view, a taxpayer may increase the basis
of his partnership interest for COD income excluded under the in-
solvency exemption of Section 108 (a) (1) (B).
In Gershkowitz, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer/partner to in-
crease the outside basis of his partnership interest because he was sol-
153. SeeNelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114,126 (1998).
154. See CS1 Hydrostatic, 103 T.C. at 406-07.
155. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 131.
156. 23 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994).
157. 88 T.C. 984 (1987).
158. See Richard M. Lipton, Insolvent Partner Taxed on Partnership's COD Income
Despite Code Provision, 81 J. TAx'N 248, 252 (1994); Richard M. Lipton, IRS Chal-
lenges S Corporation Basis Increase for COD Income, 81J. TAX'N 340, 344 (1994).
159. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9739002 (May 19, 1997); see also Shop Talk, IRS Re-
nounces its Victory in Babin, 87J. TAx'N 318, 318 (1997).
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vent and, consequently recognized COD income. 160 Moreover, the
Tax Court stated in Gershkowitz that it did not have to consider
whether an insolvent partner would be permitted to increase basis for




While the result in Nelson was unanimous, seven judges did not
entirely agree with the majority's reasoning. Judge Beghe wrote a
concurring opinion, with which Judge Halpern joined. Judge Foley
also wrote a concurring opinion joined by fourjudges.
1. Judge Beghe's Concurrence
Judge Beghe articulated five reasons why a taxpayer should be
denied a basis step-up in the S corporation stock as a result of ex-
cluded COD income.' With one exception, his arguments are ad-
dressed and dismissed by our analysis of the majority opinion 163 and
our discussion ofJudge Foley's concurrence below.'6
Judge Beghe's argument remaining to be addressed is his argu-
ment based on Section 465. Because the intent of Section 465 is to
preclude current deductions arising from basis step-ups that have not
been paid for, he contends that Section 465 should not allow an S
corporation shareholder a basis increase for an adjustment that was
not paid for, as represented by the excluded COD income. 
65
In our view, the reference to Section 465 does not supportJudge
Beghe's position. The issue before the court in Nelson was whether
the taxpayer was entitled to a basis increase. We submit that Section
465 does not apply in the determination of a taxpayer's basis. It op-
erates to preclude a taxpayer from deducting losses until his at-risk
amount is increased. This concurrence only makes a passing refer-
ence to Section 465 and does not expand on the mechanics of its ap-
plication in these circumstances, which is arguably appropriate since
it does not go to the specific issue before the court.
160. See Gershkowitz, 88 T.C. at 1009.
161. Seeid. at 1010.
162. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 130-35 (1998) (Beghe, J., con-
curring).
163. See supra Parts III.A.1-2.
164. See infra Part III.B.2.
165. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 135.
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2. Judge Foley's Concurrence
Judge Foley wrote separately to state his opinion that there is no
need to distinguish between tax-exempt and tax-deferred income,
since, based upon his reading of the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Tax Act of 1980,166 there are no items of income to increase
stock basis under Section 1367 after application of the attribute re-
duction rules of Section 108(b). 67 There is nothing in the statutory
language that supports this interpretation.
Judge Foley's argument is unpersuasive for three reasons. First,
it is internally inconsistent with the legislative history, which expressly
recognizes that insolvent partners will increase basis for the full
amount of the excluded COD income, whether or not it results in at-
tribute reduction.Iu Second, the relevant statutory provisions provide
for the existence of COD income and that such income is not taxable
to the extent of insolvency. Nothing in Sections 61 or 108 provide
that the existence or exclusion of COD income is dependent upon
the presence or absence of tax attributes available for reduction.
Third, it is not until after the basis increase and not until the begin-
ning of the following tax year that tax attributes are reduced. Be-
cause the stock basis increase occurs in the tax year before the attrib-
ute reduction, Judge Foley's interpretation of the application and
effect of those rules is not supported by the statutes.
IV. POST-NELSON OPPORTUNITIES
Despite the Tax Court's decision in Nelson, does an opportunity
remain for taxpayers to increase the basis of their S corporation stock
by the amount of any entity-level excluded COD income?
Since issuing Nelson, the Tax Court, in memorandum opinions,
has applied the Nelson holding in disallowing taxpayers a stock basis
increase for COD income excluded at the S corporation level under
Section 108. In Chesapeake Outdoor Enter. Inc., v. Commissioner,69 the
issues were (1) whether the court had jurisdiction, and (2) whether
COD income excluded by reason of Section 108 qualified as a sepa-
rately stated item of tax-exempt income for purposes of Section
166. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389. See also S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 1 (1980),
reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 620, 620.
167. See Nelson, 110 T.C. at 135 (Foley, J., concurring).
168. See S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 620, 631.
169. 75T.C.M. (CCH) 2279 (1998).
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1366(a) (1) (A).'70 After it found that it had jurisdiction, the court
stated that it had already determined in Nelson that excluded COD
income does not pass through to S corporation shareholders as an
item of income under Section 1366(a) (1) (A) and that there was no
need to repeat its detailed exegesis on the issue contained therein.'
The court stated in Chesapeake that the taxpayer's arguments were not
worth addressing and were dismissed as unconvincing. 172
A similar approach was applied in Friedman v. Commissioner,"'
which involved (1) whether the taxpayers' S corporation realized
COD income under Section 108, and (2) whether the taxpayers were
entitled to increase their basis in their S corporation stock by the
amount of the COD income.14 With respect to the first issue, the
court concluded that the S corporation did not realize COD income
for the tax year in issue. '75 In dismissing the second issue, the court,
citing Nelson, stated that even if the entity had realized COD income,
the shareholders would not be entitled to increase their stock basis to
the extent it was excluded from gross income by reason of Section
108.176 Notwithstanding the Tax Court's adherence to its ruling in
Nelson, commentary interpreting the Code with respect to this issue is
in direct conflict with that decision.'
Taxpayers taking the reporting position that excluded COD in-
come will increase stock basis should consider the potential for penal-
ties in light of Nelson. The negligence penalty is imposed when a tax-
payer fails to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the Code.
7 8
The Tax Court's negligence formulation is typically stated as the fail-
ure to do what a prudent person would do in the circumstances. 79
However, the penalty is not imposed when the law concerning the
correct treatment of a deduction at the time the deduction was taken
is not settled.'8° Thus, taxpayers who make a reasoned analysis and
reach a different conclusion than the Tax Court did in Nelson, par-
ticularly in light of the substantial amount of commentary that is at
170. See id. at 2279.
171. See id. at 2282.
172. See id.
173. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2383 (1998).
174. See id. at 2383.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 2383.
177. See Lipton, supra note 6, at 277-78.
178. See I.R.C. § 6662 (c) (1994).
179. See Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985).
180. See Hummer v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 657, 661-62 (1988).
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odds with its decision in that case, should arguably not be subject to
negligence penalties.
Practitioners should obviously advise any taxpayer for whom dis-
allowance of the basis increase would result in a substantial under-
statement of tax liability to consider disclosure to avoid any penalties
arising from such understatement. The twenty percent substantial
understatement penalty applies to the excess of the amount required
to be shown on the return over the amount of tax that is shown on
the return."' The penalty does not apply to the amount of the un-
derstatement attributable to (1) an item for which at the time of re-
porting there was substantial authority for the taxpayer's treatment;
or (2) which the relevant facts affecting the items tax treatment are
adequately disclosed in the return or a statement attached to the re-
turn. 18  The "substantial authority" standard is an objective one in-
volving an analysis of the law and application of the law to the rele-
vant facts. The standard is less stringent than the "more likely than
not" standard (i.e., greater than fifty percent likelihood of being up-
held), but more stringent than the reasonable basis standard (which,
if satisfied, will prevent imposition of the negligence penalty under
Section 6662 (b)).183
Under the Regulations, there is substantial authority for the tax
treatment of an item only if the weight of the authorities supporting
the treatment is substantial "in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary positions."1 84 There may be substantial authority
for more than one position with respect to the same item. Authori-
ties that may be taken into account include applicable provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code; proposed, final, and temporary regula-
tions; court decisions; congressional intent as reflected in committee
reports; and joint explanatory statements of managers included in
conference committee reports."" However, conclusions reached in
treatises, legal periodicals, legal opinions, or opinions rendered by
tax professionals are not authority.11
6
It might be argued that the applicable provisions of the Code
and the relevant legislative history constitute authority for increasing
shareholder basis by the distributive share of excluded COD income.
181. SeeI.R.C. § 6662(d) (2) (A) (1994).
182. See I.R.C. § 6662(d) (2) (B) (1994).
183. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-760, at 575 (1982), reprinted in 1982-2 C.B. 600,
650.
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b) (1) (1998).
185. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1387-88 (1989).
186. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b) (2) (1998).
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However, the Tax Court opinions addressing this matter raise the dis-
tinct likelihood that a court might decide there is not substantial
authority for such a reporting position."" Thus, it is advisable for tax-
payers to disclose their position to avoid the substantial understate-
ment penalty.
Disclosure for this purpose is considered adequate only where
the position has a reasonable basis and is disclosed in the manner
provided in the regulations.1 88  Unless the Commissioner has by
Revenue Procedure approved disclosure of an item on the taxpayer's
return for this purpose, disclosure will be adequate only if made on
Form 8275. Not surprisingly, the Service has not included this par-
ticular item in the list of those for which no disclosure in addition to
that on the return is required.'89
V. CONCLUSION
Under the foregoing analysis, COD income excluded under Sec-
tion 108 is an item of income that an S corporation shareholder must
take into account under Section 1366(a) (1) (A). COD income is to
be treated as if it were realized directly from the source, which puts S
corporation shareholders on par with insolvent partners. But part-
ners who receive COD income (unlike S corporation shareholders,
under the ruling in Nelson) are entitled to an increase in their outside
basis. In Nelson, the court's interpretation that Section 108(d) (7) (A)
was intended to decouple the treatment of S corporations and part-
nerships is satisfied if the statutes discussed herein are construed as
the authors advocate so that the exclusion of COD income for share-
holders is determined by insolvency at the corporate level. This con-
trasts with excludability of COD income for partners, which is deter-
mined by their individual solvency or insolvency.
Even if the presence of a windfall is conceded, as the Tax Court
in CSI Hydrostatic Testers concluded in its discussion of the prior Con-
solidated Return Regulations, principles ofjudicial restraint mandate
that the statutes be applied as written and that a strained statutory
construction should not be undertaken to remedy a perceived inade-
quacy of the legislation. That task should be left to Congress. Until
187. See Freidman v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2383 (1998); Chesapeake
v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2279 (1998); Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C.
114 (1998).
188. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a) (1) (1998).
189. See Rev. Proc. 97-56, 1997-52 I.R.B. 18.
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such time, taxpayers should be entitled to increase their stock basis by
their allocable share of excluded S corporation COD income.
However, since the Tax Court has spoken on the issue, taxpayers
must look to an appeals court, a district court, or the Claims Court fora diferen . .190
a different conclusion. Until such time, to avoid penalties taxpayers
should disclose a position contrary to Nelson.
190. See Prop. Reg. § 1.1366 (Aug. 18, 1998) (disallowing a basis increase).
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